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THE EFFICIENCY OF A DISGORGEMENT AS A
REMEDY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
SIDNEY W. DELONO*

Thesis: Economic analysis suggests that to give a contract promisee
a general remedy that would require a breaching promisor to disgorge
any benefit of breach would hinder the efficient post-contractual reallocation of performance resources. This article explores certain situations in which disgorgement appears to be an efficient remedy for
breach of contract, including cases in which the breaching party refuses
to pay contract damages at the time of breach. A rule permitting
promisees to recover as "prejudgment interest" the breacher's benefit
from withholding payment of damages would, in theory, be efficient
in allocating the risk of the breacher's credit worthiness to the best
risk bearer. Colorado has implemented this remedy, but has, over time,
extended it to require the defendant to disgorge the benefits of breach
instead of the benefits of withholding damages. This extension appears
to be unwarranted. Moreover, serious practical and theoretical difficulties in defining and measuring the benefits of either breaching or
withholding damages cast doubt on the utility of the disgorgement
remedy.
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INTRODUCTION

It is by now a commonplace that the law of contract remedies
should take efficiency' into account by encouraging contract parties to

1. A definition of efficiency often used in legal analysis is that used by Posner in
the second edition of his treatise: "'Efficiency' means exploiting economic resources in such
a way that, 'value'-human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to
pay for goods and services-is maximized." R. POSNCER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 10
(2d ed. 1977) (Emphasis in original). Posner employs the Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency
with respect to voluntary transactions: a transaction is efficient if it leads to a reallocation
of resources that increases net social value as measured by willingness to pay. Id.; Coleman,
Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoFsmRA L. REv. 509, 513-14 (1980). See
also R. POSNER, EcONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 106-08 (3d ed. 1986).
This article will differentiate between transactional efficiency, or the net gain in wealth
from a single exchange, and rule efficiency, or the tendency of a rule to establish incentives
that would lead parties to act in efficient ways. Inefficient transactions can occur under
efficient rules.
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allocate resources to their highest valued uses even after the contract
is formed. Whether or not efficiency should be the only criterion of
contract remedies, 2 it remains at least a relevant topic of inquiry.
The usual remedy for breach of contract, expectation damages, is
designed, with some notable limitations, 3 to put the non-breaching party
(the promisee) in the position he would have enjoyed if the contract
had been performed, 4 and to permit the breaching party (the promisor)
to retain any excess benefit obtained as a result of the breach., This
article explores some of the efficiency ramifications of a remedy that
would require a breaching party who refuses to pay damages at the
time of breach to disgorge the benefits of the breach to the nonbreaching party. It also examines some of the conceptual problems in
defining the "benefits of breach."
Part I analyzes the efficiency of disgorgement as both a contract
and tort remedy. Cost avoidance analysis suggests that disgorgement
is inefficient as a general remedy for breach of contract because it
inhibits efficient reallocation of performance resources by requiring

2. For a sample of the controversy over the role of efficiency as a normative value,
see Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487 (1980); Coleman, supra note 1, at 531-51; Dworkin,
Why Efficiency? A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HorsTRA L. REV. 563
(1980); Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 Ho sTRA
L. REv. 591 (1980).
3. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
4. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TEE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1979) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS]. See also U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1977) ("The
remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved
party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed, but
neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided
in this Act or by other rule of law."); 5 A. CORBiN, CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 992, 1002
(1964) ("The effort is made to put the injured party in as good a position as he would
have been put by full performance of the contract, at the least cost to the defendant and
without charging him with harms that he had no sufficient reason to foresee when he made
the contract."); Id. at § 1002.; S. Wu.uSTON & G. THOMPSON, CONTRACTS § 1338 (rev. ed.
1937).
The promisee's interest in performance (his expectation interest), is contrasted to alternative bases of recovery: restitution (the return of benefits conferred upon a breaching
party) and reliance (compensation for amounts spent in reliance upon the promised performance). See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1 46 YALE
L.J. 52 (1936). Briefly described, reliance damages and restitution damages put the promisee
and promisor, respectively, in the positions they would have enjoyed had the contract not
been entered. Farnsworth, Legal Remedies For Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv.
1145, 1148 (1970).
In addition to money damages, contract parties are sometimes entitled to specific
performance of the contract promise. See Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. Cm. L.
REV. 351 (1978).
5. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 107-08 (3d ed. 1986).

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:3

contracting parties to negotiate before efficient breach can take place.
By contrast, disgorgement appears to be an efficient remedy for the
tort of conversion, where the possible benefit of the convertor's efficient
reallocation of converted goods is outweighed by the benefit of the
certainty gained when the convertor is required to establish the efficiency
of the reallocation in a voluntary transaction. This rationale, premised
on the uncertainty of judicial determinations of value, might also justify
a disgorgement remedy in some contract breach situations. Two such
situtations are analyzed.
Part II turns to the question of whether a contract breacher may
"efficiently" withhold payment of contract damages. It compares the
efficiency of using expectation and disgorgement measures for calculating prejudgment interest. Here, too, cost avoidance analysis suggests
that a disgorgement remedy is more rule efficient than an expectation
damages remedy in calculating prejudgment interest.
Part III describes the statutory and case law of a jurisdiction that
has adopted a disgorgement method of calculating prejudgment interest.
It also traces the history whereby that remedy has been enlarged so
as to permit a plaintiff to recover the benefits of efficient breach
instead of the benefits of withholding damages. The results of this
evaluation are troublesome and suggest a practical inability to contain
a prejudgment interest disgorgement remedy to its theoretical conceptual
limits.
Part IV seeks the source of this inability by analyzing the assumption
that the "benefit" caused by either a breach of contract or a withholding
of damages can be determined by traditional legal analysis. Inherent
limitations on the causal reasoning employed by courts will increase
the uncertainty and cost of the disgorgement remedy, impairing its
ability to achieve its theoretical efficiency.
II.

REMEDY EFFICIENCY AS COST AVOIDANCE
A.

The Cost of Contract Remedies

Like the rest of the substantive law of contracts, the law of contract
remedies can be seen as a set of ready-made contract terms supplied
by the state to govern the contracts of parties who do not otherwise
agree to specific remedy terms.6 Because the law of contract remedies
will directly affect the risks and rewards of contracting, it is reasonable

6. Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual
Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971 (1983). See also Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility
and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEo STUD. 83, 8892 (1977).
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to assume that rational parties will take those remedies into account
when they negotiate the price of contractual promises. 7 A promisee
will pay more for additional contract remedies, 8 while a promisor will
demand a contract price that reflects the full costs of the risks that
the law allocates to her 9 in its remedy provisions. 10
When, for whatever reason," the parties have failed to agree about
the remedies for a breach that comes to pass, economic analysts have
argued that the law should impose the remedy that the parties would
have agreed upon.1 2 In the absence of evidence about actual agreement,
it is assumed that the parties would have selected remedies that would
minimize the joint costs of the bargain.13
The cost analysis method of recreating the remedy the parties would
have selected posits that a promisor would be willing to sell any remedy
7. See Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient
Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 629, 642 (1988). Critical to this step are the assumptions that
parties are perfectly informed about the law and the costs that contract remedies will impose,
and that they can bargain over the forms and contract prices of the remedies costlessly.
8. The value of remedies is only one component of the value of a contractual
promise. The value of the contract to the promisee is the combination of the value of the
promisee's expectation that the promisor will perform as promised and the expected value
of the remedy available upon breach. These two elements are interrelated in complex ways.
Thus, the relative probabilities of performance and breach will depend in part on the severity
of the remedy the promisor expects to pay in the event of breach. The value of performance
will often depend upon the degree to which the promisee can rely on the promised performance,
which will in turn depend upon the expected value of the remedy in the event of breach.
See Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF.
L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1985).
9. This article will conventionally refer to the contract promisor as female and the
promisee as male.
10. Economic cost is opportunity cost, the value of the alternative foregone as a
result of the activity in question. See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW 6 (3d ed. 1986).
The total cost of the contract to the promisor is the cost of performance, considered as
opportunity cost, plus the expected liability cost of breach.
11. The parties may fail to agree to explicit remedy provisions either because the
costs of the agreement process exceed the expected value of the agreement or because they
prefer the remedies supplied by the law in the absence of agreement. If the law selects the
remedy that would most often be selected, transaction costs are reduced.
12. R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 82; Craswell, supra note 7, at 663. But cf. Schlag,
An Appreciative Comment on Coase's "The Problem of Social Cost:" A View from the
Left, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 919, 929 n.39 (transaction costs may not be distinguishable from
costs of production).
13. Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 972; See Cooter, supra note 8; Compare the
argument in G. CALABRESI, Tim COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-31 (1970) that the goal of tort
law is to reduce the sum of accident costs, consisting of both the losses to the injured party
and the costs of avoiding accidents, consisting of investments in accident prevention and
the opportunity costs of reduced production and consumption.
This does not mean that the parties will allocate contract risks simply so as to minimize
outlays. "Costs"

mean opportunity costs.
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for a price at least equal to the costs of the remedy to her, and that
a promisee would purchase only those remedies that were worth more
to him than their cost to the promisor. If it can determine the relative
sizes of these quantities, a court applying this method will impose any
remedy the promisee would have purchased and the promisor would
have sold.
This method will result in contract remedies that assign specific
risks associated with breach of contract to the party who could have
avoided or minimized the risk at the lower cost, the "least cost
avoider.' 4 The court applying this method would thus reason that a
promisee must bear the risk of any loss as to which he was the least
cost avoider because the parties would have contracted to allocate the
risk to him."
B.

Efficient Breach of Contract

The cost avoidance theory is related to the concept of efficient
breach of contract. During the period of time after entering into the
contract and before performing it, a promisor may have opportunities
to reallocate the resources that she would expend in performing the
contract (the "performance resources") to some alternative use or
purchaser. These opportunities represent a potential source of profit
to the promisor if reallocation would yield a positive return after
deducting contract damages and the other costs of breach. '6 Such a
reallocation has been termed, somewhat misleadingly, "efficient
breach,"' 7 and analysts have argued that the law of contract remedies

14. READINGS IN THE EcONONICS OF CONTRACT LAW 52 (V. Goldberg ed. 1989).
15. This assumes that both parties are risk-neutral. Risk neutrality means that the
person is indifferent between a certain outcome and a probabilistic one with an equal expected
value. Thus, a risk neutral person would value a certainty of receiving $100 equally with
a 50% chance of receiving $200 and a 50% chance of receiving 0. R. POSNER, EcoNoMIc
ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (2d ed. 1977). Most people are not risk neutral. If the promisee is
risk averse, he might be willing to shift to the promisor a risk as to which the promisee
is the least cost avoider and pay the increased price the promisor would demand. But a
system of remedies has no reason to assume that promisees are, as a class, more risk neutral
than promisors.
16. These other costs would include costs the promisor may face in future contracts
because of the effect of the breach on the promisor's reputation and the transaction costs
of litigation or adjustment arising from the promisee's claim to damages for breach. This
analysis will assume that the promisor has determined that the alternative use will be sufficiently
profitable to cover these other costs.
17. "Efficient breach of contract" is a misleading phrase. "Efficiency" is commonly
used by law and economics analysts to compare the total wealth created by alternative ways
of allocating resources among parties. One allocation of resources is said to be more efficient
than another if the total amount that all affected parties would be willing to pay to bring
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should encourage such breaches.' 8
The opportunity for efficient breach can be analyzed as a risk as

to which the promisor is the least cost avoider. To illustrate, imagine
that the promisee is considering purchasing a remedy that would give

him the benefit of any gain the promisor might obtain by breaching
the contract and reallocating the performance resources. The cost avoidance method asks whether the value of such a remedy to the promisee
would exceed its cost to the promisor.

Promisors who "sell"

a

disgorgement' 9 remedy must forego at least some opportunities for

it about is greater than the amount that they would pay to bring about the alternative
allocation.
Because efficiency is a relative term, a breach of contract can be considered efficient
only by comparing performance of the contract With some specific alternative allocation
(use) of the resources that the promisor would have expended in the performance of the
contract. It is the reallocation of these resources to an alternative use, not the breach per
se, that may produce efficiency. Thus, it is more accurate to speak of "efficient reallocation
of performance resources" than of "efficient breach."
18. "Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the promisor is able
to profit from his default after placing his promisee in as good a position as he would
have occupied had performance been rendered." Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage
Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERs L. REv. 273, 284 (1970); See also R.
POSNrER, supra note 5, at 107.
The principle of efficient breach has gained the approval of the drafters of the
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONTRACTS. Id. Ch. 16 reporter's note. The Restatement conditions
its approval upon the compensation by the breaching party of loss "calculated according
to the subjective preferences of that party." Id. However, the law of contract damages
rarely awards the full subjective value of the performance to the promisee. See infra notes
48-53 and accompanying text.
Critics have advised that the doctrine of efficient breach be used with caution. See
MacNeil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. Rav. 947 (1982)
(whether different remedies will lead to efficient breach depends upon untested assumptions
about transaction costs); Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 24 Atuz. L. REv. 733 (1982); Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract
Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 111 (1981)

(arguing that using money damages instead of specific performance leads to inefficient
breaches because it ignores values not easily quantified in dollars); Polinsky, Risk Sharing
Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983) (the efficiency of the
expectation damages rule, compared to other damages measures, depends upon the relative
risk aversion of the promisor and promisee); Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency
of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REv. 1443 (1980) (problems

of detection make expectation damages undercompensatory and supercompensatory damages
are often necessary to deter inefficient breach); Schiro, Prospecting For Lost Profits in the
Uniform Commercial Code: The Buyer's Dilemmas, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1727, 1734-35 (1979)
(arguing that inefficient breaches occur because proof requirements make expectation damages

undercompensatory).
19. The term "disgorgement" is preferable to the more general term "restitution,"
which refers to the return of a benefit that has been conferred on the defendant by the
plaintiff and the return of which is necessary to avoid unjust enrichment. See Farnsworth,
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profitable breach that would be available to them under the expectation
damages remedy. They will charge a premium for such a remedy at
least equal to the value to them of the lost opportunities. The efficiency
question then becomes whether promisees would value the remedy
enough to pay this premium.
Cost avoidance analysis suggests that they would not. The opportunity to redirect promissory resources is generally more valuable to
promisors, who, unlike promisees, are usually in the business of selling
the performance resources. Promisors will have more accurate information than promisees about the likelihood that an opportunity for
profitable reallocation will arise. Promisors will usually face lower costs
of seeking out and selling the resources to alternative users. This cost
analysis suggests that, because promisors can make more profit by
redirecting performance resources than can promisees, promisors will
charge more for the lost opportunities than promisees will be willing
20
to pay and that a disgorgement remedy is inefficient.
The disgorgement remedy does not, however, necessarily foreclose
efficient reallocation of performance resources. A promisor who is
presented with an opportunity for efficient breach could negotiate with
the promisee to be released from the contractual obligation. Efficient
reallocations could take place despite a disgorgement remedy.
In the frictionless fantasy worlds that economists fondly imagine,
people can find each other and negotiate endlessly at no cost. In such
a world, the ability to negotiate around contract remedies would make
all remedies equally efficient in permitting optimum allocation of per22
21
formance resources. When this negotiation involves transaction costs,

Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract,
94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1342 (1985); "Disgorgement" refers to the transfer to the plaintiff of

a benefit obtained by the defendant from some source other than the plaintiff and will be
used in this sense throughout this article, with apologies for its unsavory alimentary connotation.
20. Promisees who anticipate having unforeseen opportunities of their own which
would increase the value of performance beyond the foreseeability limitation on expectation
damages can protect themselves by bargaining for liquidated damages or specific performance
remedies. See generally Kronman, supra note 4; Schwartz, The Case For Specific Performance,
89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979). Promisees might also wish to shift risks of breach to promisors
because of risk aversion.
21. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 15-19 (1960); Farber,
Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66
VA. L. Rav. 1443, 1449-1450 (1980); Craswell, supra note 7, at 636-40 (noting that remedies
will nevertheless affect the choice of contract partner and levels of precaution parties take);
Schiro, supra note 18.
The Coase theorem suggests that, in the absence of transaction costs and wealth effects,
the law's initial allocation of remedy entitlements will not affect the efficient outcome because
the parties can reallocate entitlements by bargaining. Thus, if they could do so costlessly,
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however, as it does in the23 real world, contract remedies will have
differing allocative effects.
The renegotiation transaction costs of a disgorgement remedy will

not be insignificant. Because neither the promisor nor the promisee can
deal with any other party in negotiating a buy-out of the contractual
undertaking, each is motivated to try to capture the entire gain from

the reallocation, secure in the knowledge that the other can deal with
no one else. 24 In the absence of a market measure of their relative
entitlements or claims to this gain, neither has any reason to give up

any of the gain and the negotiation may never reach an agreement,
even though both parties are aware that both would be better off if
some division of the premium could be agreed upon. Although the
parties could negotiate to an efficient outcome in a world of no transaction costs, many analysts have argued that the dead-weight cost of a
"bilateral monopoly" negotiation between promisor and promisee is so
high as to remove the promisor's incentive to seek out and engage in
efficient reallocations. 2 Thus, a general disgorgement remedy for breach

of contract seems inefficient.

contract parties would negotiate to the correct breach or performance decision regardless of
the presence or absence of particular contract remedies. In the presence of transaction costs,
such reallocations may not occur and the remedial law's initial allocation of risk will have
allocative effects. Coase, supra, at 15.
22. Coase, supra note 21, at 1 (1960) (in the absence of transaction costs, parties
will negotiate to efficient outcomes regardless of initial entitlements).
"Transaction costs" refers to the costs of the activities involved in engaging in a
such as finding the other party, negotiating a contract, and enforcing it.
costs constitute one of the more controversial elements of economic analysis.
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.
233 (1979); Goldberg, Production Functions, Transaction Costs, and the New
Institutionalism, IssUEs IN CO TnMPORARY MICROECONOhIfCs 395-402 (G. Feiwel ed. 1984),
reprinted in READNGs IN THE EcONOMCS OF CONTRACT LAW, 21-23 (arguing that if "transaction costs" merely refers to anything that prevents an efficient outcome, the concept is
a useless tautology).
23. See supra note 22.
24. R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 107. Economists refer to this behavior as "rent
seeking." See Goldberg, supra note 22, at 50, 70, 71. One problem is that the promisor
may be reluctant to disclose the existence of her opportunity for reallocation to the promisee
for fear that he will take advantage of it. Because of this reluctance and the mistrust of
bargaining, the promisee will have to guess at how much potential profit the promisor could
make from reallocation. This uncertainty might lead the promisee to make unrealistic demands.
25. See, e.g., R. POsNER, supra note 5, at 117-18 (discussing specific performance);
Barton, The Economic Basis for Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STrU. 277
(1972); Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at 982-83 (discussing opportunism in renegotiation).
Some dissenters from this view contend that the transaction costs of negotiation do
not exceed the transaction costs of "breach first, talk afterward" that are encouraged by
the expectation damages remedy. MacNeil, supra note 18, at 968; See also id. at 959-60,
transaction,
Transaction
Williamson,
L. & ECON.
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The Efficiency of Traditional Disgorgement Remedies For Breach
of Contract

Despite the arguable inefficiency of a general remedy of disgorgement,
restitutionary remedies 6 are common in various "failed contract" situations.2 7 Parties to valid contracts are often awarded restitution of

n.42 (noting that the expense of bilateral monopoly negotiations depend on several factors,
including the relations between the parties); Kronman, supra note 4, at 353 (negotiations
for a voluntary transfer of contract rights between existing parties to a contract avoid many
costs, such as search costs, that might attend other forms of negotiation); Farber, supra
note 18, at 1453-54 (transaction costs requiring an alternative purchaser to negotiate with
the original buyer probably less than the transaction costs of breach and settlement or
litigation); Schwartz, supra note 20, at 284-91.
26. See supra note 19 on the distinction between restitution and disgorgement. While
the expectation damages remedy seeks to achieve the goal of compensation (i.e., making
the plaintiff whole) the remedy of restitution seeks to achieve the goal of preventing unjust
enrichment, compelling the defendant to disgorge profit wrongfully obtained. A. CORBIN,
supra note 4, at 1104 (defining "restitution"); G. PALMER, LAW OF REsTrrurTON § 1.1 (1978);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 370. See also Barton, supra note 25.
27. E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.19 (1982) (which lists several such situations).
One must distinguish between restitution as a remedy for quasi-contractual claims and
restitution as a remedy for breach of contract. A plaintiff may recover restitution under
the quasi-contract doctrine in the absence of contractual promise. Thus, the law will "imply"
a contract to pay restitution when the plaintiff mistakenly confers a benefit on the plaintiff.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION (Tent. Draft No. I April 5, 1983) sec. 8. The law
will also provide a restitutionary remedy in cases of promisory estoppel, in which the
defendant's promise induced reasonable detrimental reliance on the part of the plaintiff.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 90.

Often the restitutionary remedy is available in various forms of "failed contract"
situations, in which for some reason a contemplated contract has not been formed and even
where the defendant has not been enriched. Dawson, "Restitution Without Enrichment,"
61 Boston U.L.R. 563 (1981); See e.g., Kearns v. Andree, 107 Conn 181, 139 A. 695 (1928)
(restitution of seller's costs of renovating property at buyer's request although sale contract
was unenforceable because of vagueness); Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 59 N.Y.2d 917,
452 N.E. 2d 1245 (1983) (awarding restitution of lessor's costs of renovating leasehold at
lessee's request although oral lease was unenforceable under Statute of Frauds). Cf. Boone
v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233, 154 S.W. 900 (Ct. App. Ky. 1913) (denying restitution where plaintiffs'
expense in preparing to perform a contract unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds did
not benefit defendant).
Restitution is available as a remedy to require return of benefits conferred by a nonbreaching party upon a breaching party in some cases of breach of contract. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 371; E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 12.19, 20 (1982); Friedman,

Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission
of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 504, 513. A non-breaching party who has rendered partial
performance may recover the value of that performance even if that recovery exceeds the
party's expectation interest. 12 S. WILLISTON, A TRsATisE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
1485 (W. Jaeger ed. 1970) (recovery should be undiminished by any loss promisee would
have incurred on performance); United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638 (4th
Cir. 1973) (nonbreaching subcontractor could recover from breaching prime contractor in
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benefits which they have conferred upon other parties. 2 However restitution as a remedy for breach of contract is limited to benefits conferred
upon the defendant by the plaintiff, 29 and only rarely is a party awarded
the remedy of disgorgement of profits the breacher obtained from some
other source, as she would by reallocating performance resources to
another use. 30 In most situations in which disgorgement is permitted,
one can argue that it is not inconsistent with the goal of efficiency.
Thus, what appears to be a disgorgement remedy may simply be
the most convenient method of measuring the plaintiff's expectation
interest.' For-example, a disgorgement remedy is common in contracts
for the sale of real property. Sellers who breach a contract to sell land
by selling it to a third party have been required to pay the non-breaching
buyer the amount by which the sale price to the third party exceeded
2
the contract price.
quantum meruit for labor and materials furnished even though the contract would have
been a losing contract for subcontractor). See E. FARNSWORTH supra, § 12.20.
Restitution is denied, however, where the plaintiff has fully performed and the only
breach by the defendant is payment of the contract price. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 371; Oliver v. Campbell, 43 Cal. 2d 298, 273 P.2d 15 (1954 (quantum meruit denied for
attorney who had fully performed contract for legal services); Fay, Spofford & Thorndike,
Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 336, 387 N.E.2d 206 (1979) (justifying
the rule as avoiding unnecessary valuation problems).
28. One example of disgorgement as a remedy for breach is the requirement that a
promisor who is guilty of total breach or repudiation must return the full amount of any
contract payments received, even if they exceeded the promisee's expectation damages. E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, § 12.20; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 comment
d. In Bush v. Canfield, 2 Conn. 485 (1818), the buyer paid seller $5,000 in advance for
2,000 barrels of flour at $7 per barrel. Seller failed to deliver, although at the time of
delivery the price had dropped to $5.50. Buyer would have lost $3,000 on the sale. The
court refused to deduct the $3,000 from the damages and ordered the seller to return the
entire price paid. The Uniform Commercial Code goes farther, giving the buyer a right to
the return of any purchase price paid not only upon the seller's repudiation or failure to
deliver but also upon the buyer's rejection or revocation of acceptance, with respect to any
goods involved and regardless of whether the contract was a losing one for the buyer.
U.C.C. § 2-711(t). see also § 2A-508(l)(b) for similar rule applying to leased goods.

29. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 370. The exceptions to this limitation
are not considered in this article. See J. CAL mARi & J. PERIu.o, CoNTRAcTS 652-53 (3d
ed. 1987).
30. G. PALMIER, supra note 26, § 4.9 at 437 (generally "mere breach of contract
will not make the defendant accountable for benefits thereby obtained, whether through
dealings with a third person or otherwise."). Commentators have argued for limited extensions
of the right to restitution of the breacher's benefits. See Farnsworth, supra note 19, at
1384-86 (arguing for extension of the disgorgement remedy to "abuse of contract" cases);
Friedmann, supra note 27, 516-27 (arguing for restitution where the breach has deprived
the promisee of a property or "quasi-property" interest).
31. Farnsworth, supra note 19, at 1360; Dawson, Restitution or Damages, 20 Omo
ST. L.J. 175, 179 (1959).
32. See cases cited in Friedmann, supra note 27, at 516; G. PALMER, supra note 26,
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Disgorgement in such cases can be seen as a measurement of the
plaintiff's expectation interest if one assumes that the plaintiff could
have sold the land to the alternative purchaser. 3a The fixed location of
real property and the existence of property records make it likely that
the alternative purchaser could have found and negotiated with the
plaintiff as easily as with the defendant. It is reasonable for the law to
presume that the buyer could have sold it to the alternative purchaser
at the price received by the seller, which is, therefore, selected as a
convenient measure of the expected value of performance to the buyer.
Similar use of disgorgement to measure the promisee's expectation
occurred in Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., Inc. 4 Defendant seller
contracted to sell land to the plaintiff. After the contract but before
the closing, the seller removed and sold gravel from the land. Even
though testimony indicated that removal of the gravel had not diminished
the market value of the land, the plaintiff recovered the seller's net
profits on the gravel, the court reasoning that the plaintiff could have
obtained those profits had the seller not breached.35
Disgorgement also serves as a measure of plaintiff's loss in the award
36
of profits made on sales in breach of a covenant not to compete.
Proof of the plaintiff's actual lost profits in such cases is highly speculative because of the difficulty in proving that plaintiff would have
gotten the business the defendant enjoyed. The convenient assumption
is made that the plaintiff would have profited by as much as the defendant
did.
In these instances, disgorgement is probably the best measure of the
expectation damages plaintiff suffered. Despite inhibiting promisors from
efficient breach, the remedy is not thought to be inefficient, in part
because the promisors have no cost advantage over the promisee in
reallocating the performance resources to the alternate use.
In addition to the traditional uses of disgorgement outlined above,
Professor Farnsworth has suggested the remedy of disgorgement for what
he calls "abuse of contract."" Farnswoth argues that disgorgement is

at 438; Timko v. Useful Homes Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 433, 168 A. 824 (1933). In such cases,
courts sometimes characterize the non-breaching buyer as having acquired a beneficial ownership in the land by entering the sales contract. The seller's subsequent sale of the land
to a third party is seen as a conversion of this beneficial interest. Another approach has
been to attribute the sale to a fictional agency relationship between the buyer and seller.
33. Friedmann, supra note 27.
34. 372 Mass. 688, 363 N.E.2d 675 (1977).
35. The court in Laurin rejected a claim for conversion, on grounds that plaintiff
was not entitled to possession at the time of the removal of the gravel. Id. at 689, 363
N.E.2d at 677.
36. Farnsworth, supra note 19, at 1367.
37.

Id.
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appropriate when the breach denies the promisee an opportunity to
obtain substitute performance. He considers the classic situation of the
contractor who secretly substitutes cheaper materials in the construction
of a building under a contract calling for more expensive materials.3"
By the time the breach is discovered, the expense of tearing down and
rebuilding the structure greatly exceeds the diminution in market value
caused by the breach. In such cases, courts usually limit the promisee's
recovery to the diminution in value of the structure.3 9 Because the
promisee can no longer purchase the performance he desired, Farnsworth
argues that the promisor should also be required to disgorge the savings
she realized in using the cheaper materials.
Cost avoidance analysis suggests that disgorgement would be efficient
in such circumstances. Assume that ex ante a contractor knows that the
project will offer her opportunities to "cheat" by substituting cheaper
materials. These. opportunities will reduce her costs and increase the
profit she can make. If she successfully escapes detection by the promisee
until re-construction becomes unfeasible, then under the traditional judicial rule, she can capture the difference between these cost savings
and the diminution in market value caused by the substitution, if any.
It is important to note that this figure will be at most equal to the cost
savings, and could be less. The expected value of this capture will be
taken into account in pricing the job, reducing the contractor's costs
by an equal amount.
Now assume that Farnsworth's proposed remedy of disgorgement is
put into place. The promisor's incentive to cheat will be removed because
the promisor will have to give back any cost savings otherwise obtainable
by substitution. The contractor's opportunity cost of the contract will
rise by the amount of the forgone cheating premium, and the price of
the contract to the promisee will rise by the same amount.
Whether the disgorgement remedy is efficient in this situation depends
upon whether the promisee would be willing to pay this increased price.
This question turns on the amount by which the promisee values the
use of the specified materials over the inferior materials. If this amount
exceeds the cheating premium, Farnsworth's proposed rule is efficient.
There is good reason to believe that the promisee values the superior
materials more highly than the inferior materials by more than their
38. The classic chestnut in this field is Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y.
239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921) in which Judge Cardozo held that where a contractor inadvertantly
substituted pipe of the wrong brand, the owner was entitled to recover only the reduction
in value of the building, rather than the cost of tearing out and replacing the pipe, on
grounds that the breach was "insubstantial."
39. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 26, § 12.13, at 868. The rule is otherwise if the
cost of repairs is insubstantial. If the breach is willful, the finding of substantial performance
may be questionable. Id. at 593-94.
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price difference: He must value them by at least their price difference
(otherwise he would have specified the cheaper materials) 40 and he might
value them by more. Thus, while the cheating premium is less than or
equal to the price difference, the value of the remedy to the promisee
is greater than or equal to the price difference. On these assumptions,
Farnsworth's remedy is likely to be more valuable to promisees than it
is expensive to promisors.
Disgorgement is also an efficient remedy in contracts in which the
promisor is financially unable to respond in damages. In such situations,
disgorgement can discourage inefficient, opportunistic behavior that the
expectation damages remedy would encourage. An example will illustrate:
Assume that in March, Seller contracts to sell Buyer widgets for delivery
in June. Seller's expected profit is $1 per widget. In May, the market
having risen, Alternative Purchaser offers Seller the then market price
for the widgets, which is $15 over the contract price. Widgets are relatively
fungible but the market is highly volatile. Seller knows that there is a
90% chance that, at the time Buyer must cover, 4' the market will have
risen to $50 over the contract price and a 10% chance that it will have
fallen to $3 over the contract price.
If Seller will be financially able to pay the Buyer's full claim for
damages, she will reject the offer: 9007o of the time she will receive $16
in gross profit but will have to pay Buyer $50 damages, leaving her
$34 in the hole. Ten percent of the time she will have to pay the Buyer
only $3, leaving her a net profit of $12. The combined value of these
chances, or the expected value of the breach, is minus $29.40,42 which
is less than the certain profit of $1 that performance would yield. In
other words, the breach is inefficient.
However, if the Seller is judgment-proof, so that she cannot pay
Buyer's claim for damages, the gamble is a good one. The effect of
market rise is simply to wipe out the chance of any profit, not to subject
the Seller to a loss of $34. The effect of a market fall still gives her
a $12 profit. The expected value of breach is $1.20, 4 which exceeds the
$1 profit available if Seller performs.
Because the judgment-proof seller can speculate with less risk than
the financially responsible seller, an expectation damages remedy en-

40. This analysis assumes that the promisee knows of the price and the value of
the substituted materials. If not, it cannot be assumed that the promisee would not have
specified them in the original contract.
41. It is assumed that the seller can sell to the Alternative Purchaser without repudiating the contract and thus that the buyer's remedy, by cover or market formula, will
be measured as of a later time.
42. (0.9 x -34) + (0.1 x 12) = -29.40.
43. (0.9 x 0) + (0.1 x 12) = 1.20.
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courages judgment-proof sellers to engage in inefficient breaches. Under
a general disgorgement remedy for breach of contract, the judgmentproof seller will not engage in inefficient breaches of this sort because
the remedy removes any opportunity for gain. Such a remedy tends to
reduce the transacting costs related to insuring against the credit risks
of doing business with judgment-proof promisors. In summary, although
cost analysis suggests that disgorgement would not be efficient as a
generally available remedy for breach of contract, the remedy would
appear to be efficient in some situations. First, disgorgement may be
efficient when expectation damages are difficult to calculate and are
likely to approximate the disgorgement measure. Second, disgorgement
can be more efficient than expectation damages when the promisor's
inability to recover the full amount of expectation loss creates incentives
for the promisor to engage in certain types of inefficient, opportunistic
behavior.
D.

The Efficiency of Disgorgement as a Remedy for Conversion

Although inefficient as a general remedy for breach of contract,
disgorgement is a common remedy for the tort of conversion. Traditional
restitutionary remedies permit a plaintiff suing a convertor to "waive
the tort" and to require the defendant to disgorge all profits made as
44
a result of the conversion, even if they exceeded the plaintiff's losses.
Some of the efficiency arguments made against disgorgement as a
contract remedy seem equally applicable to disgorgement as a tort remedy.
It is obvious that conversion can be just as transactionally efficient as
a breach of contract. The convertor might make more profit from the
plaintiff's property than the plaintiff would lose from the unlawful use.
Thus, requiring disgorgement of such profits weakens incentives for
convertors to seek out and enter into efficient "reallocations."
Yet, contemporary law and economics literature does not propound
a doctrine of "efficient conversion." A different efficiency argument is
marshalled to support the law's refusal to countenance involuntary transactions of this sort, one that goes something like this: Even if the
converted good is traded in a recognized market, a court cannot be sure
of the subjective value of the good to the owner and so cannot be
certain of the efficiency of reallocating the good to the convertor. A
judicial determination of the value of the converted good to its owner
incurs this cost of uncertainty as well as significant transaction costs.
Because the convertor can obtain the converted good from the market
at much lower transaction costs, the law requires her to obtain the goods

44. See Friedmann, supra note 27; Dawson, supra note 27; Farnsworth, supra note
19, at 1361.
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in a voluntary exchange to insure that her use will indeed be allocatively

efficient .41
E.

Disgorgement Reconsidered

The analysis of conversion has some application to the previously
stated efficiency justification for rejecting the disgorgement remedy for
breach of contract. A contract breacher, like a convertor, makes a
unilateral decision to reallocate resources and relies on a post-breach
judicial decision to fix the amount of the promisee's damages. Our
previous efficiency analysis of the disgorgement remedy did not consider
the transaction costs of a judicial determination of contract damages
because of the implicit assumption that expectation damages give the
promisee the equivalent of full performance."
If expectation damages fulfilled their theoretical purposes, promisees
would be indifferent as to whether contractual promises are performed
or damages are awarded.4 7 In practice, however, promisees are not
indifferent to performance because awards of damages under the ex-

45. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972). Analogizing the efficiency of rules
against conversion to the efficiency of rules against theft, Landes and Posner argue that
depriving the convertor of his profit will have the efficient effect of compelling him to
resort to the marketplace whenever possible. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOWMC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 153-58 (1987). They also argue that failure to protect property
interests would lead owners to over-invest in security measures to prevent unlawful takings.
Id. This argument seems questionable. If owners of converted property or beneficiaries of
looted trusts are awarded full compensatory damages, they would be indifferent whether
the torts were committed or not. Because they would experience no economic loss as a
result of the wrong, they would not spend excessive amounts on security. If remedies are
undercompensatory, of course, this argument stands up, but so would an analogous argument
applied to remedies for breach of contract.
46. Professor MacNeil offers an example of the arbitrariness of distinguishing conversion from breach of contract on the basis of "property" interests by an example of a
seller who "reclaims" goods that have been shipped to the buyer's warehouse in order to
engage in efficient breach. The buyer would be entitled to disgorgement for conversion, yet
in many complex commercial transactions, "there is no a priori basis for selecting any
particular time or event for determining that the transaction is closed, that new property
rights are now established, and that with them a new, efficiency-neutral status quo has been
achieved." MacNeil, supra note 18, at 963-64.
47. R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 107. But see U.C.C. § 2-609 comment 1:
"...the essential purpose of a contract between commercial men is actual performance and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus
the right to win a lawsuit and ... a continuing sense of reliance and security
that the promised performance will be forthcoming when due is an important
feature of the bargain."
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pectation doctrine rarely give a promisee the complete value of his loss. 48
Many forms of a promisee's loss are not recoverable: losses whose
existence is uncertain; 49 losses that were not foreseeable at the time the
contract was formed; 0 losses that the promisee could have avoided or
mitigated;" losses from emotional disturbance;1 2 and losses from the
expenses of contract enforcement." Whether or not these limitations on
recovery are justified by considerations of rule efficiency, 4 the result is

48. See Schiro, supra note 18, (arguing that remedies under the Uniform Commercial
Code systematically undercompensate plaintiffs for lost profits and therefore encourage
inefficient breaches); Farber, supra note 18, (arguing that, because of litigation costs and
detection costs, "supercompensatory" damages are more efficient than expectation damages);
Schwarz, supra note 20, at 276-77 (damage awards are undercompensatory); Sebert, Punitive
andNonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective
of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. Rv. 1565 (1986). This has suggested to many commentators that expectation damages should be made more compensatory.
It might also be argued that expectation damages are insufficient to prevent inefficient
breaches because they are not awarded to non-contracting parties at the time of formation
of the contract, but nevertheless must be "counted" in determining the transactional and
rule efficiency of breach, because they are part of the "aggregate willingness to pay" on
which the criterion is premised.
49. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 352. See Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v.
Consolidated Pipe Co. of America, 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959) (under the U.C.C.,
refusing to award damages for loss of goodwill as too speculative).
50. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SEco'D) OF CONTRACTS § 351; Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex.
341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854); Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S.
540 (1903); Keystone Diesel Engine Co. v. Irwin, 411 Pa. 222, 191 A.2d 376 (1963) (refusing
to award lost profits). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350.
51. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350; Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge
Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929).
52. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 353. Emotional distress reduces aggregate
human satisfaction if people would pay to avoid it. See supra note 8. If the promisor is
forced to negotiate with the promisee before the breach, the value of the emotional distress
of breach can enter into the negotiation and an otherwise inefficient breach can be avoided.
On the other hand, failing to award damages for emotional distress makes sense under a
regime of expectation damages because it encourages parties who have idiosyncratic attachments to contract performance to disclose these and secure additional security for performance
from the promisors.
53. Thus, under the "American Rule" in the absence of a contractual agreement,
the attorney's fees expanded in enforcing a contract remedy are not recoverable. Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). See Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 356 comment d. It has been argued that, because of the expenses
of enforcement, the non-breaching party should always be willing to accept less than the
expectation damages from the breaching party. See Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The
Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970).
54. An efficiency analysis of the limitations on expectation damages is beyond the
scope of this article. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 114-15 (foreseeability requirement
efficiently requires promisees to disclose potential losses in advance, permitting promisors
to take appropriate precautions); Cooter, supra note 8 (contract damages limitations create
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that contract damages are undercompensatory. 55 Expectation damages do
not measure the promisee's willingness to pay for performance at the
time of breach. The limitations on expectation damages will lead to
transactionally inefficient breaches.5 6 Because of problems of subjective
valuation, the promisee's consent to a reallocation of performance resources is the only certain proof of the efficiency of a breach of contract.
The problematic nature of the judicially determined expectation damages remedy raises the issue considered in the analysis of "efficient
conversion." If the cost of uncertainty in a post-conversion determination
of damages exceeds the transaction costs of requiring potential tortfeasors
to resort to the market, it is possible that the cost of uncertainty in
post-breach determination of damages likewise exceeds the transaction
costs of requiring a promisor to negotiate with the promisee before
breaching. Requiring a voluntary exchange between the promisor and
promisee before breach would provide assurance that the breach will be
truly efficient, just as would requiring a voluntary exchange between
the convertor and her victim. 7 But this gain in certainty would be
purchased at the expense of any lost opportunities for efficient breach
that were frustrated by the costs of negotiation.
The problem reduces to this: Are the transaction costs of a bilateral
monopoly negotiation between the two contract parties "relatively high"
so that the court is justified establishing a liability rule, permitting
unilateral breach on condition that expectation damages be paid, or
"relatively low" so that the court is justified in requiring recourse to
the market to avoid the risk of an inaccurate determination of damages?5"
To date most economic analysis has answered "relatively high," and
has supported a liability rule rather than a property rule59 for the

efficient incentives to minimize losses); Goetz & Scott, supra note 6 (efficiency of mitigation
requirement); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77
COLUM L. REv. 554, 568-74 (1977).
55. See supra note 18. Even when the promisee is the least cost avoider of a risk
of loss due to breach, the promisor's failure to take that risk into account in deciding to
breach will lead to transactionally inefficient breaches whenever the promisor would be willing
pay more for performance than the alternative user at the time of breach.
56. The theory of efficient breach posits that the promisor will breach whenever she
can show a profit after paying the promisee's expectation damages. But in such cases, breach
will be inefficient when the promisor's gain from breach does not exceed the amount by
which expectation damages fall short of actual value of performance to the promisee.
57.

See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 45.

58. See Schlag, supra note 12, at 930-31 n.43 (asking what a court should do in
situations in which the transaction costs of trading in entitlements are "middle.").
59. See the discussion in Kronman, supra note 4, citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 45.
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promisee's contract interest. The breacher is free to breach without
obtaining the promisee's consent, but must pay damages.
That this conclusion is correct is not at all obvious, but it is not
within the scope of this Article to test it, or even to speculate about
how that might be done. Instead, two other facets of the disgorgement
remedy that might bear on its efficiency will be examined. First, even
if one accepts that the promisee's interest in performance is protected
by a liability rule, should the promisee's interest in payment of damages
for breach be protected by a liability rule or a property rule? Second,
is a property rule, a disgorgement remedy, practically feasible as a remedy
for protection of either interest?
III.

DAMAGES FOR FAILURE TO PAY DAMAGES

Although a party in breach of contract becomes liable to the nonbreaching party for payment of damages, the breaching party may, and
usually does, withhold payment of damages until ordered to do so by
a court. General use of the term "efficient breach of contract" has
obscured the distinction between two separate breaches: the breach of
the duty to perform and the breach of the duty to pay damages for
non-performance. A breacher who fails to pay the full amount of the
promisee's damages at the time of breach 6° can obtain economic gain
through the use of the money she should have paid. The promisee can
incur economic loss because of the delay in receiving payment.
The literature of efficient breach has not addressed the possibility
that failure to pay contract damages when due might itself be efficient
if the promisor can earn more on the money than the promisee would

("[A] right or entitlement is protected by a property rule when it can be
appropriated by a non-owner only if he first purchases permission to do so from
the owner of the right. When a right is protected by a rule of this sort, one who
appropriates it without the owner's permission will always be subject to a special
sanction-typically, a fine or imprisonment. If a right is protected by a liability
rule, in contrast, a non-owner who unilaterally appropriates it need only compensate
the owner, after the taking, for any loss the owner suffers. The compensatory
amount which a non-owner must pay for taking a right protected by a liability
rule is set by a representative of the state rather than by the owner of the right
in a voluntary transaction between owner and taker.").
The expectation damages rule is a liability rule and the disgorgement rule is
a property rule.
60. Much will depend upon the time when breach occurs. Breach normally occurs
at the time of performance. However, breach may occur before the time of performance
if the promisor repudiates the contract. Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 El. & Bl. 678 (1853);
Missouri Furnace Co. v. Cochran, 8 F. 463 (W.D. Pa. 1881); U.C.C. § 2-610 (permitting
non-breaching party to resort to any remedy for breach upon promisor's repudiation of
contract).
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lose by not receiving it. The above discussion suggests two possible
analyses of the efficiency of withholding damages, corresponding to the
liability and property rules, or expectation damages and disgorgement.
A liability rule/expectation damages approach would promote efficient
withholding of damages and would evaluate the rule efficiency of interest
remedies by their tendency to encourage or deter efficient withholdings.
A property rule/disgorgement analysis would reject efficient withholding
of damages and would evaluate interest remedies by their tendency to
encourage the breaching party to borrow money in the financial market
rather than to "borrow" damages from the plaintiff.
A.

Ex Ante Cost Avoidance Analysis of Prejudgment Interest

The law recognizes a claim for interest, damages for delay in the
payment of money due, as a remedy for breach of contract. 6 As with
any other contract remedy, a promisee's right to recover interest accruing
before judgment will affect allocative efficiency. The efficiency of the
disgorgement remedy of prejudgment interest can be analyzed by the
cost avoidance method: Would the parties be likely to give the promisee
a disgorgement remedy for failure to pay contract damages immediately
upon breach? They will do so only if the benefit of the remedy to the
promisee/plaintiff exceeds the opportunity cost of such a remedy to the
promisor/breacher. These values can be analyzed at the time of contracting, ex ante, and after breach, ex post. The parties would presumably
prefer the remedy that maximized the joint value of the contract.
Under a compensation theory of prejudgment interest the promisor
is assigned the power to withhold contract damages. Under a disgorgement
theory of prejudgment interest the promisee is granted the right to
immediate payment of contract damages. There is no ex ante reason to
suppose that either promisors or promisees will have, as a class, superior
investment opportunities at the time of breach. 62 Thus, there appears to
be no reason to believe that relative opportunity costs alone would lead
to an ex ante assignment of the risk of delayed payment of contract
damages to either party.

61. See Restatement (Second of Contracts § 354. Although parties may agree to the
payment of interest as compensation for the use of money, such agreements are not discussed
in this article, which concerns only judicial remedies for the non-payment of contract money
damages. Such agreements may provide for interest to be paid either before or after maturity
of the obligation. See 5 A. CoRtN, Supra note 4, § 1045; D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON Tim
LAW OF REMEDIEs 3.5 (1973).
62. Promisees will often have need of funds to effect cover or other mitigation of
the injury caused by the breach. Promisors may, however, have need of the funds to effect
the alternative, more profitable, performance. It is impossible to say which of these two
forms of investment has the greater expected return in the abstract.
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Post-Breach Cost Avoidance Analysis of Prejudgment Interest

The method chosen for the award of prejudgment interest will affect
the post-breach behavior of both the breaching promisor and the promisee, who will have the relation of debtor and creditor.63 Both debtors
and creditors have borrowing costs" as well as opportunities to obtain
returns on money they invest. It is assumed that parties will tend to
borrow whenever their investment returns exceed their borrowing costs. 65
The efficient remedy would "assign" the post-breach damage payment
to the party with the superior post-breach investment opportunity. Only
the compensation method tends to have this result, as is shown by the
following analysis.
1. Compensation Method. The compensation method compensates
the creditor for the deprivation of the use-value of the money until
payment. The measure of this loss is either the creditor's cost of coverthe interest that the creditor must pay to borrow the funds elsewhereor the loss of profit on investment that the creditor was unable to make
because of the lack of the money. The principle of mitigation of damages6
would deny the creditor any losses that could have been avoided had
the creditor covered by obtaining funds elsewhere at a rate that is less
than his investment return. If the creditor cannot cover, his loss is the
forgone investment return, if any.
If a compensation remedy is used, debtors will tend to withhold
payment whenever they will earn more from the withheld money than
they will ultimately have to pay to the creditors. The compensation
remedy would award creditors the lesser of their borrowing expense in
obtaining "covering" loans or, if profitable cover is impossible, their
forgone investment returns. Debtors will withhold payment only when
both their borrowing costs and their investment returns are higher than
their creditors' losses. Such debtors can, in effect, borrow at below
market rates from their creditors and would lose more by paying the
debt than they would ultimately owe in damages measured by the creditors' losses.

63. The following discussion assumes that the parties are risk-neutral.
64. For the purposes of this discussion, "borrowing costs" include returns on existing
investments that must be foregone if the investment is liquidated to obtain cash for payment
of a debt or to make another investment. In such cases, the party in question is, in effect,
borrowing from himself.
65. As usual, this analysis assumes that the parties are risk-neutral. Risk-averse parties
might not borrow to invest. This analysis also ignores the possibility of consumption rather
than investment of the indebtedness. Consumption can be seen as an investment that has
a value known to the consumer.
66. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 350.
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If either the debtors' borrowing costs or investment returns are less
than the losses of their creditors, the compensation method would induce
debtors to pay promptly. If debtors' borrowing costs are less than the
damages they owe, they would be better off borrowing and paying
damages. If debtors' investment returns are less than the damages they
will owe, any gains they would realize by withholding the funds would
be exceeded by their liability for their creditors' losses.
As can be seen, under the compensation method the money owed
will tend to move toward the party with the highest investment opportunities, whether or not that party has the higher borrowing costs. This
apparently efficient result is not achieved by the disgorgement method,
however.
2. Disgorgement Method. The disgorgement method measures the
benefit to the debtor, who enjoys the use-value of the money until
payment. The measure of this benefit is either the borrowing costs saved
because the debtor did not have to borrow the money elsewhere or the
return on any investment that the debtor made with the money.
If the disgorgement method is used, debtors with superior investment
opportunities will tend to pay the debts regardless of their borrowing
costs or the losses of their creditors. 67 They have no motive to withhold
payment because any profit they may make will be captured by the
creditors. This capture might sweep in some profits resulting from the
debtors' own skill or efforts in connection with the investments.
The result under the disgorgement method is more ambiguous if
debtors with no advantageous investment opportunities have higher borrowing costs than the damages they will owe. If such debtors must
borrow to pay the debt, then their "benefit" from non-payment is their
borrowing cost. Even if they must ultimately disgorge this benefit to
their creditors, they have no incentive to choose repayment over withholding. In such cases, and in cases in which debtors can pay the debt
without borrowing, the following analysis applies.
If the disgorgement method is the creditors' exclusive remedy, so
that they can recover only their debtors' gain and not their own losses,
debtors with inferior investment opportunities have nothing to lose by
withholding and nothing to gain by repayment. Such debtors might
strategically withhold payment. Their creditors, facing losses larger than
their potential recovery, may offer a discount for prompt payment.
If the disgorgement method is supplemented by the compensation
method, so that creditors can recover the greater of their losses or their

67. Such debtors may negotiate with their creditors to obtain loans at rates that are
less than the debtors' borrowing costs but greater than their creditors' investment returns.
This does not, however, affect the analysis.
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debtors' gains, such debtors will pay promptly in all cases unless they
are judgment proof. They will have nothing to gain and everything to
lose by withholding payment.
In summary, under the "pure" disgorgement method, unsupplemented by a compensation remedy, the money will, without negotiated
transfers, tend to remain with or gravitate to the party with the poorest
investment opportunity. Under a combination compensation and disgorgement method, the money will move toward the creditor regardless
of the parties' investment opportunities.
C.

The Effect of Borrowing Rates

So long as the effects of different borrowing rates are ignored, the
compensation method of prejudgment interest appears to be more efficient
than the disgorgement method in allocating money to the party whose
investment opportunities are the highest. But this analysis ignores the
factors that determine the "borrowing rate" of each party. Variations
in this rate are almost entirely due to the riskiness of the loan, that is,
the creditworthiness of the party.68 If the contract creditor is required
to mitigate his losses by obtaining funds elsewhere, his borrowing costs
will be the measure of his losses. 69 The compensation method permits
the debtor, in effect, to utilize her creditor's lower borrowing costs, or
stronger credit rating, as her own expense of borrowing. The debtor
obtains money at a cost below the rate that she would be charged in
the money market. The creditor, however, is not being compensated for
the risk associated with the debtor's use of the money, risk that would
be reflected in the debtor's borrowing rate.
Like a potential convertor, a contract debtor can obtain the withheld
good (money) in a market transaction. The debtor can enter the market
for the withheld good at low transaction costs. Lenders in established
70
credit markets probably face lower costs of extending credit to a debtor

68. R. HAMrLToN, FTNDAmENTALS OF MODERN BusINEss § 1.16 (1989); See R. POSNER,
supra note 5, at 180, 368. The other elements of the interest rate are common to all
borrowers and include the time value of money and the normal rate of return.
69. A debtor should not be permitted to count her creditor's actual borrowings and
investments as "covering" transactions if they would have been economically rational in the
absence of the withholding. One might expect a risk-neutral creditor to borrow and invest

whenever his investment opportunities exceed his borrowing costs. By analogy to the theory
of the lost volume seller, a creditor's "covering" loan and investment should not reduce
the debtor's liability if it would have been made in the absence of the withholding. To
show damage from the withholding, however, a creditor should have to show that he had
exhausted his ability to borrow and still missed favorable investment opportunities.
70. This would include the costs of obtaining and evaluating information relevant
to the riskiness of the loan and of insuring against unavoidable credit risks by loss spreading.
See R. PosNER, supra note 5.
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than does her contract creditor. The contract creditor is, therefore, not
the least cost avoider of the costs of the debtor's credit risks and should
not be assigned that risk by the compensation method of prejudgment
interest.' In addition, a post-breach judicial determination of a creditor's
compensatory damages presents a special risk of inaccuracy because his
forgone investment opportunities might be, or appear to be, speculative
or convenient afterthoughts. Despite its apparent allocative inefficiency,
the disgorgement measure of prejudgment interest is more efficient than
the compensation method for reasons similar to those pertinent to the
conversion remedy.
IV.

A CASE STUDY IN DAMAGES AS INTEREST

We now descend from the crystalline forms of economic theory to
the woolly world of law as it is. In practice, remedies law rarely employs
either the compensation method or the disgorgement method as a measure
of prejudgment interest. The requirements of mitigation and foreseeability
limit inclusion of consequential damages in prejudgment interest.72 Prejudgment interest is awarded, if at all, at a statutory rate. 73 Such statutes
have provided for interest at a fixed rate to be awarded on amounts
found to be due for breach of a duty to pay liquidated sums due under
contracts, notes, and bills; for money obtained by fraud; and in other
situations. 74 Statutory interest may roughly approximate an award under
the compensation method, which is intended to compensate the creditor
for the loss of use of the money. 7" Interest is measured by the disgorgement method only when the money was obtained by breach of
76
fiduciary duty.
Attempts to implement a more efficient prejudgment interest remedy
can run afoul of practical and theoretical problems not taken into account
in the assumptions of economic models. A case in point is furnished

71. In other words, a rational contract promisee would discount the value of a
promise by a higher assumed interest rate on potentially withheld damages than a lender
would charge the promisor. The promisor would therefore not purchase the right to withhold
damages, i.e., would not take a loan, from the promisee.
72. A. CoRonN, supra note 4, §§ 995, 1046; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 337
(1932); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTP.ACTS § 354. See Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v.
Paull, 313 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1963); Columbian Mut. Life Assur. Soc. v. Whitehead, 193
Ark. 598, 101 S.W.2d 455 (1937).

73.

See generally Note, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 Nw. U.L.

REv 192 (1982).
74. The Colorado statute infra, note 77, is an example.
75. D. DOBBS, supra note 61, at 169. (contrasting the award of interest as damages
intended as compensation for the losses of the plaintiff with award of interest as restitution,
intended to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant).
76. See Friedmann, supra note 27.
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by the state of Colorado, which has by statute 77 adopted the disgorgement
remedy to measure prejudgment interest. The statute permits a promisee
to recover from the promisor any gain that the promisor realizes from
the wrongful withholding of money or property until it is paid or
judgment is entered.
The ostensible purpose of the statute is to implement the disgorgement
method of calculating prejudgment interest. But this principle has undergone a mutation in breach of contract cases. Courts applying the
rule have forced defendants to disgorge the benefits that they have
realized by reallocating performance resources rather than the benefits
they have realized by withholding the damages payments. Given the
propensity for breachers to withhold damages and incur liability for
prejudgment interest, the new statute is tantamount to a general disgorgement remedy for breach of contract. 78 The story of how a simple
prejudgment interest statute effected such a change in contract remedy
law is a cautionary tale of the perils of legal conceptualism in the new
age of law and economics.
The statute had its genesis in Davis Cattle Co. v. Great Western
Sugar Co., 79 an innovative application of disgorgement as a remedy for
breach of a sale of goods contract. The Great Western Sugar Company
was sued for breach of contract in a class action by its suppliers, some
3,600 growers of sugar beets. The growers had sold sugar beets to the
company under a contract that fixed the price as a percentage of the
company's net receipts from the sale of the sugar made from the beets.
Although that price could not be determined until the beets had been
processed and the sugar sold, the contract required the company to
make an initial payment shortly after delivery of the beets. The initial
payment was to be followed by interim payments over the course of
the next eleven months, during which time the beets were processed and
the sugar was sold.80
The contract required the initial payment to be at a rate that "shall
be at the highest rate per ton [of beets] that the Company may deem
to be justified taking into consideration anticipated returns from the
sale of sugar and the sugar content of beets."'" The company had

77. CoIo. REv. STAT. § 5-12-102 (Supp. 1982). This statute is described and discussed
more fully below.
78. See infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text. Colorado is apparently unique in
this respect. Farnsworth, supra note 19, at 1369 ("In no jurisdiction do courts generally
apply the disgorgement principle."); Friedmann, supra note 27.
79. 393 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd 544 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977).
80. Davis Cattle, 393 F. Supp. at 1167-70.
81. Id. at 1169.

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:3

historically estimated what it would ultimately pay the growers and had
paid about 85% of the anticipated total payment in the initial payment. s2
In 1974 the sugar market was affected by several events that caused
the price of sugar to skyrocket. The company paid the growers an initial
payment much lower in relation to the (higher) price of sugar then its
historical practice had been in more stable markets. The growers sued
on grounds that the initial payment was so low as to breach the contract.83
The court found that, in making this payment the company did not
consider the anticipated returns from the sale of sugar as the contract
required, but instead selected a lower payment level in order to save
interest costs it would otherwise have incurred in borrowing the money
to make a larger payment. 8 4 The court held that the company breached
the contract by fixing the payment in this way. 85 In an alternative finding,
the court held that the company breached the contract by setting the
86
initial payment in bad faith.
Because full payment was made by the end of the processing year,
87
the growers' damage from the breach arose from the delay in payment.
An interest award premised purely on the doctrine of expectation damages
would have equalled the growers' economic injury resulting from the
delay in receiving the initial underpayment. In Colorado, interest at the
statutory rate supplanted expectation damages from breach of contract
to pay money.88 Under Colorado statutory law, however, the growers
could recover no prejudgment interest because their claim for under89
payment was unliquidated.
The court met this obstacle creatively. Although agreeing that statutory interest could not be awarded on an unliquidated claim, the court
held that under the common law, "moratory interest," or interest as
damages, could be awarded on an unliquidated claim. 90 The court also

82. Id.
83. Id. at 1170.
84. Id. at 1178. The company argued unsuccessfully that the lower payment was
essential to avoid the risk of overpayment, which might have occurred if the price of sugar
dropped during the processing/sale period (as in fact it did).
85. Id.at 1175.
86. It did not help the company's argument on this point that, in attempting to
prevent a hostile tender offer for its shares, the company had projected a net return on
sugar much higher than the projection upon which the growers' initial payment was calculated.
Id. at 1177.
Interestingly, the court did not allude to the good faith requirements of the Uniform
Commercial Code, then in effect in Colorado and in at least some of the states in which
the growers resided.
87. Id. at 1177-78.
88. CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 5-12-102.
89. Id.
90. Davis Cattle, 393 F. Supp. at 1193-94. The trial court relied on an extensive
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rejected the company's alternative argument that the growers were limited
to the statutory rate of interest, then six percent. The court looked
instead to restitution law, which measured damages by the amount of
benefit to the wrongdoer resulting from breach. 9'
Even so, the path to judgment was not yet clear because the company
was not shown to have made a profit on any money withheld. The
court instead awarded as moratory interest the amount of interest expense
the company saved by not borrowing against its bank lines of credit in
order to make an initial payment at the required level. 92 The evidence
indicated that the company would have had to pay at least 11.5% to
borrow the extra money, and the court awarded the growers prejudgment
interest at this rate. 93
The Davis case appeared to establish a "pure" disgorgement remedy
for breach of a contractual duty to pay money. 94 Breach of a contractual
promise to pay money presents a special case in which the two duties,
performance or payment of damages, are effectively, if not conceptually,
identical. Thus, in Davis the same benefit accrued to the company from
its withholding of performance and from its withholding of damages.
Nor did the court have reason to clarify whether the "failure to pay
money due" was the failure to perform or the failure to pay damages.
Perhaps this ambiguity was responsible for the ensuing legislative failure
to clarify the scope of the remedy in cases in which the withholding of
performance and the withholding of damages diverged.
Soon afterwards, in 1979, the Colorado legislature adopted some
aspects of the disgorgement remedy theory of Davis in an amendment
review of Colorado caselaw, including Bankers Trust Co. v. International Trust Co., 108
Colo. 15, 113 P.2d 656 (Colo. 1941), which held that interest as damages, and not as
statutory interest, could be awarded for the tortious withholding of money or property. The
plaintiff in Banker's Trust sought rescission of a purchase of securities induced by fraudulent
misrepresentation. Banker's Trust was thus a garden variety restitution case, involving a
tortious taking or detention of money. Id. at 33-34, 113 P.2d at 665. The Davis Cattle
court applied this rule to a breach of contract case, holding that the measure of moratory
interest is the gain or benefit realized by the wrongdoer. 393 F. Supp. at 1191.
91. Indeed, the language of the court in Davis Cattle suggests that the plaintiffs did
not even have the option of recovering expectation damages, which is consistent with
restitutionary precedent but not general contract principles. 393 F. Supp. at 1178.
92. Id. at 1194-95. Except where the wrongdoer saved an amount owed to the
plaintiff, none of the cases cited by the court as precedent had measured the wrongdoer's
benefit by the amount saved, only by the amount realized. The Davis Cattle court did not
comment on this difference, which could be argued to be economically irrelevant.
93. Id. In fact, the evidence showed only that the company could have borrowed
an additional $25 million at this rate. Id. at 1195. It was unclear whether the company
could have borrowed sufficient money to make an adequate initial payment at any rate,
since the company's available bank loan financing for the sugar beet payment was less than
the initial payment amount that the court found to be required under the contract.
94.

Id. See supra note 91.

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:3

to the Colorado prejudgment interest statute. The amended statute provides that when there is no agreement as to the rate of interest to be
paid, creditors shall receive interest as follows:
(a) When money or property has been wrongfully withheld,
interest shall be an amount which fully recognizes the gain or
benefit realized by the person withholding such money or property
from the date of wrongful withholding to the date of payment
or to the date judgment is entered, whichever first occurs; or,
at the election of the claimant [interest on the amount withheld
at the statutory rate of 8%] ...
(3) Interest shall be allowed . . even if the amount is
unliquidated at the time of wrongful withholding or at the time
when due. 9
The statute contains at least three striking features not present in
the predecessor statute: prejudgment interest is permitted on unliquidated
claims, the interest is measured by the wrongdoer's benefit, and the
interest runs against a person withholding "money or property."
The statute suffers from a drafting ambiguity because of the uncertain
meaning of "the gain or benefit realized by the person withholding such
money or property." This can refer either to benefits resulting from the
breach of contract or to benefits resulting from withholding payment
of damages after breach, or perhaps to both.9 Davis gives no guidance
to interpretation because the benefits from the company's withholding
of the initial payment and the benefits from the company's withholding
of damages were the same. One is left with the question of what is the
correct measure of gain or benefit where the breach involves failure to
deliver something other than money.
This question was answered in Great Western Sugar Co. v. Northern
Natural Gas Co., 97 in which the same sugar company, now versed in
the magic of moratory interest, essayed its hand as a plaintiff. The
company purchased natural gas used in the processing of its sugar beets
from a natural gas company. The gas was purchased under contracts
that permitted the seller to interrupt service to the company whenever,
"in its absolute discretion and without liability" to the buyer, the seller
was "required to do so" in order to meet the demands of higher priority
98
residential and commercial users.

95.

CoLo. REV. STAT.

§

5-12-102.

96. See infra note 106.
97. 698 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1985), aff'd on reh'g for damages sub nom. Great Western
Sugar Co. v. KN Energy, Inc., No. 87CA1477, slip op. (Colo. App. May 4, 1989) aff'd

778 P.2d 272 (Colo. App. 1989).
98. Great Western, 698 P.2d at 773.
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During the winters of 1973 through 1979, the seller interrupted service
to the company several times under the authority of the interruption
provision." During these interruptions, the company was required to use
fuel oil, which was more expensive. To recover this extra expense, the
company sued the seller, arguing that the interruptions breached the
contract because they were not "required." The court found that the
interruptions breached the contract and awarded the company damages
of $3.6 million, representing its increased costs of cover in the fuel oil
market. 100
Relying on the new statute, the company also sought disgorgement
of the benefit to the seller resulting from the breach. 01' The company
offered two theories supporting such a claim, one based on the benefit
to the seller from its retention of the gas withheld and one based on
the benefit to the seller from its retention of the damages payments
0 2
found to have been owing to the company.1
In support of the first theory, referred to as the "gas husbanding"
model, the company introduced evidence that the seller had benefited
from its withholding of the gas in several ways: the overall price of gas
had increased, thus increasing the value of the withheld gas in the seller's
hands; the gas withheld was available for sale at higher prices to residential users; and the seller had used the value of withheld gas to
increase its rate base, and thus its income. From these increases in value,
the model deducted the interest that would have been earned by the
defendant on the contract price of the gas had it been sold to the
buyer. 0 3 As of the time of the trial on interest in 1987, the court found
the net benefit to be nearly $12 million.' 4
In support of the second theory, the company submitted three calculations of the seller's benefit on the damages withheld using, alternatively, the seller's internal rate of return on equity, the interest rates

99. The seller sought unsuccessfully to justify these interruptions by the national
policy of conservation resulting from the gas crisis of of the 1970's. Id. at 778.
100. Great Western Sugar Co. v. KN Energy, Inc., No. 87CA1477, slip op. at 1.
101. Id.
102. 778 P.2d at 273; Slip opinion, supra note 97, at 1-2.
103. 778 P.2d at 274. The rate used to calculate this interest component was the
average internal rate of return on investment achieved by the seller over the interest period.
Id. While this measure is reasonable, reflecting a possible investment of the sale proceeds,
it is not necessarily the "correct" rate. What, for example, if the seller had invested the
sale proceeds by purchasing more natural gas? If the seller was indeed husbanding natural
gas in anticipation of future price increases, such a purchase would seem natural. Presumably,
the seller could have purchased at least as much gas as it sold to the buyer, and so would
have realized benefits on the purchased gas equal to those that it realized on the withheld
gas. This theory would result in no net benefit from the withholding.
104. Id. at 273.
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that the seller paid for capital, and the rate of interest paid to the seller
by its subsidiaries for money loaned to them. These calculations produced
benefit figures ranging from $7.8 million to $8.7 million.105
The trial court held that the first theory must be applied and that
damages must be measured by the benefit the seller gained by withholding
the gas rather than by withholding damages. The court relied upon the
statute's reference to the "gain or benefit realized by the person withholding such money or property."' ° 6 From the $11.9 million in benefit
accruing from the withheld gas, the court deducted the $3.6 million in
compensatory damages and awarded the company $8.3 million in prejudgment interest.' 0 7
By selecting the gas husbanding model, the Northern court completed
the transformation of the prejudgment interest statute into a general
rule of disgorgement of the benefits to be gained from reallocating the
performance resources. Northern, like Davis, does not even appear to
give the plaintiff the option to recover the benefits the defendant realizes

105. Slip opinion, supra note 97, at 2.
106. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 5-12-102(a). The statute is ambiguous: Does it mean "realized
by the person [asthe result of]withholding such money or property," or does it mean
"realized by the person [who is]withholding such money or property?" The Northern court
interpreted the statute in the first sense. The legislative history suggests that lawmakers
considered the application of the statute to compel the disgorgement of benefits resulting
from property withheld. See Transcript of Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee Hearingson
S. 463, March 12, 1979, at 12 (analogy of convertor of a cow being liable for the value
of milk obtained during its wrongful detention). When the phrase is read to apply to the
"withholding" of property due under a contract, breach of contract is conceptually transmuted
into the tort of conversion of the subject matter of the contract.
107. Great Western, No. 87CA1477, slip op. at 2. The trial court deducted the actual
damages suffered by the plaintiff from the moratory interest award on the theory that "it
is proper to deduct from the gross amount of such gain or benefit derived from the wrongful
withholding of gas the amount [KN Energy] now has to pay in order to exercise its retention
rights in that gas. Only in this manner can the Court fully recognize [KN Energy'sl gain
or benefit. A contrary finding would be punitive in nature as [KN Energy] has already paid
for the gas that was not delivered to [Great Western]." Slip op. at 6. This reasoning was
upheld on appeal. Great Western, 778 P.2d at 275-77.
An example may clarify the point. Consider a goods contract breached by the seller
by sale to a third-party. Assume that the contract price is 100, the market price at the time
of breach is 125, and the price realized by the seller from the sale to a third party is 150.
The buyer, who covers at the market price, will recover expectation damages of 25, equal
to the benefit of his bargain. If he also recovers as restitution the entire 50 that the seller
realized on breaching the contract, the buyer will have a windfall of 25, receiving the
equivalent of performance for 75.
The court in the Northern Gas case avoided this result by deducting the actual damages
(the first 25 in the example) from the interest damages, which would lead to a total recovery
of 50 in the example given. The court reasoned that the seller did not realize the full 50
as a result of the breach because the seller's "cost" of the breach was the 25 the seller
had to pay the buyer as expectation damages.
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from the withheld damages payment. Under Colorado's rule a defendant's
liability for delayed payment is now wholly unrelated to the gain she
realizes from delaying payment and the plaintiff's award is wholly unrelated to his losses from delayed payment. Thus, Colorado has achieved

neither a disgorgement nor a compensation scheme of prejudgment interest. What it has done is to make efficient breach perilous if the

breacher cannot accurately estimate the amount of her promisee's damages so that they can be paid at the time of breach.108 While it creates
a deterrent to the withholding of contract damages, the irrelevance of
the disgorgement amount to the actual benefit of withholding will make
the remedy either excessive or inadequate in most cases.
The Colorado courts have liberally construed the disgorgement remedy. It has been held to apply not only to contracts to pay money or
deliver goods but to the "withholding" of any contractually required
performance. 109 The courts construe withholding to commence whenever

a right to damages arises.110 Despite the statute's use of the word
108. There is no precedent yet on the effects of an inadequate but good faith payment
of damages at the time of breach. Presumably, prejudgment interest would be due on the
unpaid amount. But if, as Northern mandates, interest is computed on the withheld property
rather than the withheld damages, defendant's attempted payment of damages will be
unavailing and will not reduce the defendant's liability for prejudgment interest.
109. Benham v. Digby Trucking Co., 685 P.2d 249 (Colo. App. 1984) (insured's
breach of contractual obligation to pay assessment to receiver of interinsurance exchange);
Great Western Sugar Co. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 661 P.2d 684 (Colo.
App. 1982) (breach of contractual obligation to sell natural gas); Hott v. Tillotson-Lewis
Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 1220, 1222-23 (Colo. App. 1983) (breach of contract to construct a
house).
In Isbill Assoc. v. City and County of Denver, 666 P.2d 1117 (Colo. App. 1983),
applying the statute to the damages due on a lessee's tort claim against its lessor for water
damage, the court noted that the legislative history of the statute expressed an intention to
benefit all plaintiffs, not just those seeking recovery of money due on a contract to pay
money. Id. at 1122.
The federal district courts sitting in Colorado have refused to apply the statute as
broadly as has the state appellate court. Lowell Staats Min. Co. v. Pioneer Caravan, Inc.,
645 F. Supp. 254 (D. Colo. 1986) (refusing to apply the statute to "garden variety breach
of contract cases."). Id. at 259. See also EEOC v. Trailways, 28 FEP 552 (D. Colo. 1981)
in which Judge Winner, the author of the opinion in Davis, refused to apply the statute
to an employee's claim for wages in a wrongful discharge case, stating: "To extend to a
wrongful discharge case the concept of awarding interest for money wrongfully withheld
would mean that every time anyone won a suit for breach of contract, monetary interest
would have to be awarded. Having spent the time I did in studying prejudgment interest
before writing Davis Cattle, I am unable to conclude that prejudgment interest should be
awarded on the unliquidated amount here involved, and I say this with full awareness of
the amendment to the Colorado interest statute. [citation omitted]." 28 FEP at 553-54.
Unfortunately the judge did not explain how his opinion in Davis should be limited so as
not to apply to all suits for breach of contract.
110. See Isbill Assoc., 666 P.2d 1117. (applying the statute to a tenant's tort claim
for property damage against its landlord).
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"wrongfully," plaintiffs have not been required to show that the withholding was tortious or in bad faith."' As a result, the statute applies
to any breach of contract.
V. THE PROBLEM OF CAUSATION: LEGAL
CONCEPTUALISM AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
This part analyzes the formidable transaction costs of calculating
the benefits to be awarded under a disgorgement remedy. The foregoing
analysis has proceeded on the assumption that the "benefits of breach"
or the "benefits of withholding damages" could be identified and measured. These phrases imply a direct causal relationship between the breach
or withholding and some benefit. As Professor Farnsworth has pointed
out, the causal relationship between breach and benefits is often simply
assumed in restitutionary theory." 2 Likewise, the misnomer "efficient
breach" implies a false causal relationship. The benefits related to efficient breach are not "caused" by the breach. The benefits result from
some allocation of performance resources, an allocation that itself may
or may not also "cause" the breach. These relationships do not coincide
with traditional legal conceptions of causation, which erect intractable
problems in the calculation of disgorgement benefits.
The relationship among the breacher's allocation of resources, the
breach, and some benefit may be quite tenuous. Both before and after
contracting, a promisor may make allocational decisions that make performance less likely or impossible. Promisors may accept additional
contracts, invest potential performance resources in other projects, and
take various other risks that jeopardize the performance of the contract.
These decisions presumably benefit the promisor.
A disgorgement remedy aimed at these benefits would have to satisfy
some standard of legal causation." 3 Classically, this would require showing that the benefits were caused by the contract breach, for it is the
breach and not the resource allocation upon which a plaintiff's claim
is based. When the benefits precede the breach, this burden cannot be
met." 4 The Colorado statute, by employing an explicit temporal condition,
11I. Benham, 685 P.2d 249 (breach of contractual obligation to pay assessment to
receiver of interinsurance exchange).
112. Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1343.
113. On the meaning of legal causation see H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN
nm LAW (2d ed. 1985). On the role of cause in economic analysis see Coase, supra note
21; Landes and Posner, Causation In Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 18 J. LEoAL
STUD. 325 (1989); Culp, Causation, Economists, and the Dinosaur:A Response to Professor
Dray, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1986).

114. For example, in performing Contract A a promisor may suffer damage to
equipment, making it impossible to perform Contract B. One might analogize this to a sale
of goods to the Alternative Purchaser, so that the Promisor's profit from Contract A is a
"benefit" obtained "as a result of" the breach of contract B.
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precludes recovery of benefits that do not arise "from the date of
wrongful withholding" until payment or judgment."' If the date of
withholding is the date of performance, and if the wrongdoer has fully
realized the benefit before the date of performance, disgorgement of the
benefit is presumably unavailable." 6 The need to tie the disgorgement
remedy causally to the breach rather than to the decision to reallocate
(and breach) creates the opportunity for strategical evasion of the prejudgment interest remedy. If the breacher can time her transactions so
as to realize the benefit of withholding before the breach, she can avoid
disgorgement liability for the withholding, although the practical effect
may be identical to a realization of benefit after the withholding. Economically, the results are identical but the requirements of legal causation lead to disparate treatment.
A.

Calculation of the Benefits from Reallocating Performance
Resources

1. Identified Performance Resources. At times, such as in the sale
of goods existing at the time of the contract, the parties may informally
recognize an intention to use specific performance resources in the
performance of the contract, yet the buyer may never acquire a right
to recover for their conversion.' ' 7 When these goods are reallocated to
some other use, calculation of the benefits of the reallocation would
seem simple.
But this is not always the case. Consider the well-known case of
Acme Mills & Elevator Co. v. Johnson." 8 Defendant Johnson, a farmer,
contracted to sell 2,000 bushels of wheat to the plaintiff Acme, a grain
dealer, at $1.03 per bushel to be delivered at harvest time. The market
rose sharply, and the alert Johnson sold his wheat at $1.16 to a different
buyer. By the time of harvesting, however, the market had dropped to
$1.00 per bushel. When Johnson failed to deliver, Acme sued for the
extra $.16 per bushel Johnson realized on the second sale." 9 This remedy

115. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 5-12-102(a).
116. Actions that amount to repudiation might be construed as "wrongful withholding,"
however, as they constitute breach giving the promisee the immediate right to damages.
U.C.C. § 2-610.
117. The concept of identification to the contract is used in the Uniform Commercial
Code, § 2-501, as the process whereby a buyer of goods obtains a special property and
insurable interest in the goods. Identification occurs for existing goods at the time of
contracting (U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(a)); and for future goods when the seller ships them or marks
them as the goods to which the contract refers. U.C.C. § 2-501(l)(b).
118. 141 Ky. 718, 133 S.W. 784 (1911).
119. Id. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the Acme breach would not have
been efficient if Johnson had informed Acme at the time of his sale to the alternative
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was refused, the court measuring damages as the difference between the
market and contract price at the time and place for delivery. Under this
measure Acme had suffered no loss (and had in fact benefited from
Johnson's failure to perform).
Had a disgorgement remedy been available, the benefit of the reallocation would seem to have been thirteen cents per bushel, the price
the breacher received for the goods less the contract price. Yet, Johnson
could have purchased grain in the market at $1.00 to satisfy his obligation
to the buyer. If he had, he could have realized his profit and fulfilled
his contract as well (earning three more cents a bushel in the process.)
One could argue that the benefit caused by the breach was, therefore,
only the amount by which this market price exceeded the contract price:
in the Acme case, zero.
Professor Farnsworth's leading commentary on the application of
the disgorgement remedy to breach of contract would apply such a
version of legal causation in determining the benefit resulting from
breach. 120 Professor Farnsworth calls for a "strict cause in fact" requirement that would limit disgorgement to benefits as to which breach
was essential in a "but-for" sense, i.e., benefits that the breacher could
not have obtained without the breach. Benefits would be measured as
the least amount of savings that the breacher could have realized by
not performing the contract. Thus, if instead of breaching the contract,
the breaching party could have purchased goods in the market in order
to satisfy the alternative transaction, disgorgement would be limited to

the amount the breacher saved by not doing

So.'
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This approach would have led to a different result in Northern. The
gas seller could have both realized its gain and fully performed at a
minimal cost. At the time of breach, for example, it could have purchased
additional gas for sale to the buyer or for storage to replace the gas
it sold. Its savings would have been the purchase price of gas at the
times of breach less its sales price from the sale to the plaintiff. The
breach was in all likelihood not necessary to the gain the seller realized,
and Farnsworth's method would have precluded a disgorgement award.

purchaser that he would not be able to perform his contract. Under Section 2-713, Acme's
damages for Johnson's repudiation would be the difference between the market price at the
time Acme learned of the breach, presumably $1.16, and the contract price. These damages
would have eliminated Johnson's profit.
120. See Farnsworth, supra note 4.
121. See id., at 1344 (possibility of seller's market purchase of substitute widget to
sell to alternative buyer destroys causal link between breach and gain). Ironically, by permitting
disgorgement only where the breach was necessary to the gain, Farnsworth's strict cause
requirement absolves promisors who unnecessarily breach contracts and punishes those whose
breach was necessary to the gain.
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A corollary of Farnsworth's strict cause requirement is the doctrine
of joint cause. Any part of the breaching party's gain that results from
her own skill or efforts must be deducted from the total gain in order
to calculate the amount of gain "caused" by the breach. Farnsworth
analogizes this principle to the deduction of brokerage or similar costs
or fees from a wrongdoer's gross profit in cases of fiduciary dis22
gorgement. 1
This doctrine, too, would have altered the Northern result. The $11.3
million gain in value, of equity that the seller realized was due in large
part to the seller's contribution to the value of the gas in storing it, in
using the gas in- rate-making, and in diverting the gas to higher paying
customers. In addition, the seller took market risks of price changes in
gas. Deduction of the value of the seller's contribution would have
greatly reduced the award.
To allow breachers the benefits of Farnsworth's imaginary or hindsight efficiencies will not encourage them to act efficiently at the time
of breach. But such an approach is preferable to the post hoc ergo
propter hoc fallacy exemplified in Northern. In neither case are the
benefits of reallocation causally linked to breach with sufficient vigor.
2. Non-Identified Performance Resources. To attempt to trace the
benefits from the allocation of resources that have not been designated
to the contract is even more of an exercise in fiction. For example, in
Northern, the court purported to value hypothetical gas that was not
sold to the buyer by deeming it to have been stored for years in an
underground storage facility, where it generated an increase in the seller's
equity. But the seller could plausibly have argued that the "buyer's gas"
was never purchased by the seller, or that it was sold to residential
customers, or even that it was sold in later years to the buyer itself.
All these stories would have been equally "correct" in the absence of
any identification of specific gas to the contract. In selecting from among
the fictional futures of the fictional gas, the court has no economic or
other principle to guide it. A remedy so unmoored to reality can achieve
neither efficiency nor justice.
3. Measuring Benefit by "Savings" Resulting from Breach. An even
deeper level of fiction is reached when courts consider, as did the court
in Davis, that a breacher benefits from breach by the amount of "savings" realized from failure to perform. When performance resources
have never been allocated to the contract, one cannot speak meaningfully
of their "re"allocation to higher valued uses. For example, consider a
manufacturer who sells goods that may contain defects that will cause
predictable losses. The manufacturer should spend resources on quality

122.

Id. at 1347-48.
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control to the point of diminishing return, measuring amount spent
against loss avoided. At this level of precaution the manufacturer is
acting efficiently and the joint cost of the product is minimized even
23
though some defects will occur.
If the inevitable defective product breaches the contract, how is the
"benefit of the breach" to be calculated? The nanufacturer did not
realize a gain from any obvious intentional breach, but a court applying
the "savings" rationale might ask what the promisor would have had
to spend in order not to breach, as did the court in Davis. The amount
the manufacturer might have saved by not spending enough to reduce
defects to zero percent might approach infinity. Disgorgement of this
amount would give the plaintiff a property interest in the hypothetical
dollars that the manufacturer did not spend, nor even considered spending. The principle would also reach, for example, breaches in which the
promisor acted efficiently by overbooking or overscheduling production.
The "benefits of breach" would equal the cost of the excess capacity
the promisor would have had to maintain to assure performance.
A general disgorgement remedy would not be efficient in such cases
because it would lead the promisor to overinvest in precautionary care
and raise the joint costs of the contract. Promisees profit when the joint
costs are minimized and would be charged more for a general disgorgement remedy than it would be worth to them.
4. Informational Transaction Costs of Calculating the Breacher's
Benefit. The administrative and uncertainty transaction costs of calculating the benefit under a disgorgement remedy will usually exceed those
of calculating a loss under an expectation damages remedy.124 In the
case of breach of contract, the injury is the shortfall between the breach
situation and the promisee's expectation; the benefit of breach is the
improvement of the promisor's condition over that which performance
would have created. The benefit is often more costly to calculate than
the injury because of the parties' unequal access to relevant information.
The party in possession of the best information about the injury, the
contract plaintiff, is the one with the burden of proving it. The party
in possession of the best information about the benefit, the breaching
promissor, is the one resisting the claim. The same inequality applies
to information about the hypothetical world that would have ensued
upon full performance. The promisee knows what he was expecting from
performance, but not what the promisor was expecting. Finally, a prom-

123. Cooter, supra note 8.
124. It has been noted that courts tolerate more uncertainty in calculating losses than
in calculating benefits for restitutionary purposes. Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA.
L. REv. 65, 72 (1985).
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isor may subjectively value reallocation of performance resources in ways
that the promisee can never prove. 2 Subjective benefits of breach would
be immune to disgorgement, although they would be very real.
These information inequalities are magnified by the conjectural nature
of the calculation of the breacher's gain. The transaction costs of such
a calculation are lower for the promisor than for the promisee. This
suggests that the promisor is the least cost avoider of the risk of her
benefit from a reallocation of performance resources. Assigning the
remedy, and therefore the risk, to the promisee is inefficient.
B.

Calculation of the Benefits from Withholding Payment of
Damages

Even where the disgorgement remedy is limited to the benefits from
withholding the damages payment, legal causation does not furnish an
acceptable measure. Unlike the typical fiduciary case, a breach of contract
rarely involves an identifiable fund from which to trace benefits, and
26
the resulting calculations are fictional and arbitrary.
An example is furnished by the benefit measurements rejected by
the court in Northern. The plaintiff introduced evidence of the seller's
average investment return, its lending rate to its subsidiaries, and its
average borrowing rate. 27 These produced measures of benefit that
differed by almost $1 million. But which of these is the "correct"
measure of the seller's benefit from withholding payment of damages?
One possibility requires the promisor to disgorge the benefit of the
alternative transaction, the result reached in Northern. Such an approach
recognizes that breach damages may be deemed "invested" in any of
the promisor's property, including the profit-making activity that replaced
performance of the contract. But the Northern court did not compare
the amount of the unpaid damages to the amount the seller had invested
in the withheld gas. The reallocation is only one of the plausible in-

125. This would not only include the rare case when the promisor takes malicious
delight in breaching, but would include more common cases, as when the promisor consumes
the performance resources herself, i.e., by going fishing instead of painting plaintiff's barn.
A disgorgement of this benefit would require a measure of the promisor's subjective valuation
of her leisure. While a plaintiff may seek to prove his subjective valuation of performance
as a measure of expectation damages, it is not likely that he could succeed in proving his
adversary's subjective state. See also Tredennick and Cairns, Colorado'sPrejudgment Interest
Statute: Potential for Market Rate Interest 12 CoLo. LAW. 1605 (1983).
126. On the problem of tracing, see G. Palmer, supra note 26 §§ 2.14, 2.16; Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 202; Restatement (Second) of the Law of Restitution, Tentative Draft
No. 2 (April 6, 1984) §§ 34-41.
127. See Farnsworth, supra note 4 (referring to the cost of substitution, the least cost
the wrongdoer would have incurred in performing the obligation).
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vestments the promisor might have made with the damages payment.
A second method, suggested by Professor Farnsworth's cost of
substitution analysis, gives the breacher the benefit of the doubt by
measuring the benefit as the lowest cost that the breacher could have
incurred in discharging the damages obligation. 28 This method assumes
that if the breacher were forced to pay damages on time, she would
have done so at the lease expense to herself, a not unreasonable assumption. The seller in Northern could have liquidated its least profitable
investment or borrowed at the lowest available rate in order to pay the
damages.
Yet this method involves the problem of retrospection. If the breacher's benefit is to be measured by her return on some investment, and
if the investment chosen is to be the one with the least return, then as
of when will that return be measured? The breacher can wait until trial,
pick her least profitable investment, and perhaps pay nothing in interest.
This method would encourage the breacher to invest in hedge-type
speculations in which "losers" are expected to be balanced against
"gainers." After entry of judgment, the plaintiff can be given the
"benefit" of whichever investment dropped while the breacher will enjoy
the winner. A possible solution is to attempt a judicial, ex post determination of the expected return of the investments at the time of breach,
but this method creates obvious valuation problems and attendant costs.
A third approach is to measure the benefit to the breacher as if
the breacher had invested the withheld damages in the highest return
investment in her "portfolio." Such a measure will give the breacher
an efficient incentive to pay damages upon breach and the breacher will
determine the most efficient way to manage her portfolio so as to make
that payment. Again the problem of retrospection will arise, permitting
the plaintiff to "cherry pick" from the defendant's portfolio at the time
of judgment. In this case, however, the defendant will probably avoid
the risk by paying the damages on time.
Even if a fund from which the damages payment would have been
made could be identified with certainty, a court attempting to apply a
disgorgement remedy would still face the problem of tracing. Professor
Farnsworth argues that a court applying a disgorgement remedy should
refuse to "trace" ill-gotten gain through transactions that enhance its
value. 29 While it might simplify judicial determinations, this approach
would certainly stimulate strategic behavior in potential disgorgement
defendants, who would simply "launder" money before investing it. If
disgorgement is an efficient remedy, courts must engage in tracing in
order to make the remedy work.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

The disgorgement remedy responds to our sense that no one should
be able to profit from her own wrong. But things change when wrongs
are very profitable. As a general remedy for breach of contract, disgorgement would violate the principle of cost avoidance in all but a
few specific situations. Whether or not the storied costs of post-contract
renegotiation would exceed the gains in preventing inefficient breach,
any such excess would soon be dwarfed by the transaction costs of
judicial calculation of benefits from breach. Our ideas of legal causation
are poorly suited to this calculation.
As a remedy for withholding damages, disgorgement is more promising, although problems of calculating benefits remain. A judicial rule
of thumb that selected the highest rate of investment or borrowing in
the breacher's portfolio would seem appropriate. Approaches, such as
Colorado's, that award the benefits of reallocation as a remedy for
withholding damages are better left to the place where unsuccessful
legislative experiments go.

